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Damage
Assessment
In
the book FLOOD a fire/flood combination
wrecks and guts the city. In such
circumstances there would be no
limit to the damage. Flooding without
fire is a less terrifying prospect
but the consequences are still dire.
For
days, even weeks, ponded water will
hang around in low-lying areas.
Elsewhere there will be a covering
of stinking oily sludge and debris.
Homes will be uninhabitable and
services will not function. Animal
and human corpses may be trapped.
Many thousands of people will have
been evacuated. Looters will roam
the streets.
Contamination.
London's sewage system is gravity
fed, draining from west to east
out to treatment plants at Beckton
and Crossness. These areas will
be extensively flooded putting the
entire system out of action and
resulting in widespread contamination.
Add industrial waste, household
rubbish and animal excreta and the
flood waters will become a cocktail
of bacteria, viruses and parasites.
Hepatitis
A is a major risk, particularly
to the young. E.coli swept in from
riverside pastures causes diarrhoea
and in its most virulent form, kidney
and brain damage. Salmonella frequently
appears after a flood as does the
parasite protozoa cryptosporidium
which is present in animal excreta
and causes acute gastroenteritis.
Weil's disease is spread in water
containing rat's urine and is generally
fatal. Typhoid and cholera are both
water-borne threats.
In
some cases these diseases will require
vaccination, in others rapid and
efficient treatment. A near impossibility
with the NHS damaged and overstretched.
Infrastructure
and utilities. When an embankment
collapses under the strain of overtopping
it unleashes a wall of water. Moving
at speed and carrying rubble, this
acts like a battering ram. Fast
currents scour foundations. Damage
to buildings will certainly result,
the degree varying with construction
and location. Some of this damage
will be apparent immediately, effects
like subsidence may take time to
show up.
The
electricity distribution network
may survive but at local consumer
level there will be widespread disruption.
Fuse junction boxes and wiring will
have to be replaced and on a large
scale this will take months. Gas
supply will similarly be affected
at consumer level. Pipes permeated
by water will need to be drained
before supply can be restored.
Telecommunications
will be in trouble. Thirty to forty
BT exchanges fall within the flood
zone and all BT's main cables enter
at basement level. In the streets
green distribution boxes will be
exposed to damage. Fibre-optic cables
are particularly sensitive to any
form of ground movement.
London
Underground will be severely hit.
The central zones and lines south
of the river will flood up completely
with risk of heavy loss of life.
With the exception of the Victoria
and Jubilee lines, the network is
old and decaying and structural
damage to the brickwork may well
prove irreparable. Three million
people travel on the underground
each day. Loss, or even partial
loss of the system would result
in a haemmorhaging of the workforce.
The
surface rail network is less at
risk. On the south bank most lines
run above street level and should
be reasonably secure. Of the main
line stations, Victoria is likely
to be inundated and the Eurostar
terminal at Waterloo is also vulnerable.
Roads
will be cluttered with debris and
abandoned and overturned vehicles.
Once they are cleared the main concern
will be faults in the traffic control
systems. A proportion of the city's
buses and taxis will have suffered
flood damage.
Public
services. Between twenty and
twenty five hospitals are located
in the flood zone and around two
hundred schools.
Schools
will face the same kind of problems
as many other buildings: possible
structural damage, problems with
wiring, heating and sanitation,
the need for extensive cleaning
in view of contamination. Additionally
laboratory equipment and computers
may be lost if the schools had unsufficient
time and manpower to move them to
safety.
Hospitals
are a more serious case both in
terms of damage sustained and inability
to function effectively for many
months after the flood.
Guys
and St Thomas's are two of London's
largest teaching hospitals. Both
are located very close to the south
bank of the Thames, the grounds
of St Thomas's actually abutting
the river. Structural damage to
the hospitals is almost certain
along with very serious flooding.
Between
them Guys and St Thomas's have over
1500 patient beds and employ 6000
staff. Floodwater on the lower levels
will knock out the generators and
main kitchens. At St Thomas's alone
there are sixty lifts. These will
cease to function along with all
other electrical equipment.
In
terms of expense, the most critical
losses will be in the radiotherapy
departments. Both hospitals are
equipped with CT and MRI scanners
and each has a linear accelerator.
Guys bought theirs recently with
a £2 million lottery grant.
Because the machines are heavy and
need a secure platform, they are
invariably housed on lower ground
floor. Flooding will wreck them.
Even if funds were to be found,
complex equipment like this cannot
be replaced overnight.
Commerce.
Shops and businesses in the flood
zone will be closed, their stock
and fittings wrecked and records
lost. Smaller firms are likely to
fold, larger ones will struggle
for survival. The tourist trade
will cease abruptly and may take
years to recover. In the long term
there will be massive unemployment.
So
long as the underground system is
out of action, people will have
trouble getting to work. If and
when they do, they will be unlikely
to find heating or lift services
for months after the flood. Telecommunications
will be patchy at best. In Docklands
with its high rise buildings and
international business this will
be critical. Firms may find it easier
to relocate to Paris or Frankfurt.
London could lose its status as
the financial centre of Europe.
The
result of all this is likely to
be a deep and long lasting recession
with the possiblity that London
may never regain its pre-flood status.
Globally there will be winners and
losers. Many countries have investments
in the U.K. which would suffer,
others would benefit from the reduced
competition. This is all supposing
the the international insurance
industry is able to cover claims.
If not, the inevitable conclusion
is financial meltdown.
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Official
Complacency
The
Thames Barrier has given London
a sense of security. It has also
given the authorities an excuse
to stand down flood emergency plans
and cut funding for emergency response.
Local
Authorities. Local authority
EP officers hold lists of the most
vulnerable people in their boroughs,
the elderly and disabled, and are
expected to work with the emergency
services and social services in
the event of evacuation. They are
also responsible for setting up
reception centres and catering facilities
for evacuees. Research shows that
while most EPOs are equipped to
do this on a small to medium scale,
they are not geared up for the possibility
of tidal flooding.
Before
the Barrier was completed, all EPOs
were provided with a map of London
marking the eighteen and twenty-seven
foot contour lines and areas susceptible
to long term ponding. These maps
are no longer available. Today's
officers have little idea which
parts of their borough are at risk
or where people could be sent to
in safety.
Lack
of coordination between boroughs
is also a problem. EPOs tend to
rely on sleeping contracts with
private contractors for emergency
assistance, heavy machinery hire,
catering etc. Most of these contractors
have arrangements with more than
one borough. This is acceptable
where incidents are localised but
in the event of widespread flooding
it will lead to a shortfall in resources.
Exercises.
In pre-Barrier days, the Emergency
Services in London each had contingency
plans for tidal flooding and regular
joint exercises were held. The plans
were extremely detailed, dealing
with evacuation of schools, commandeering
of small boats, creation of priority
traffic routes etc. They even had
prepared scripts for official radio
announcements.
These
plans have been discarded and the
tidal threat no longer forms part
of the Services' remit.
Officials
at the EA say they would like to
run a multi-Service tidal flooding
exercise, but it has been impossible
to get the Services together. Police
say they would willingly cooperate
but have been told tidal flooding
is no longer a possibility.
Metropolitan
Police Contingency plans and text
of Radio Announcement, 1979
Click to listen to the Daytime Scripted
Radio Announcement
(this
may take 2 minutes to download)
Flood
plain development. The ostrich-like
attitude to the possibility of a
major tidal flood in London has
one further and frightening consequence:
extensive development on land that
is potentially at risk. According
to a report by Middlesex University's
Flood Hazard Research Centre, 'The
Thames flood plain through London
is probably the site of the greatest
increase in flood prone investment
in Britain, if not in Europe.'
Since
completion of the Barrier, London
has been extensively redeveloped.
Most of the construction is to the
east of the city in low-lying areas
round the old port and docks. Places
like Wapping, the Isle of Dogs,
Silvertown, Woolwich, Thamesmead
and Rotherhithe (see contour
map). The new buildings are
high-quality, prestige type. There
are shopping malls, restaurants,
hotels and two international exhibition
centres. The area is served by the
Docklands Light Railway, the Jubilee
extension of the Underground and
by London City Airport.
Contour Map- Flood Risk Zone
Click
for Larger
Good
communications attracts business.
International banks, dealers, brokers,
accountants and lawyers compete
for premium office space. Most of
the UK's newspapers are written
and printed here. At one site alone,
Canary Wharf Estate in Docklands,
the workforce is edging towards
65,000.
This
part of London would bear the brunt
of a major tidal flood. It flooded
in 1953 and it would flood again
if the Barrier were to be overtopped
by a storm surge. It would also
be terrifyingly exposed to fire
travelling up the Estuary on a petrochemical
spill.
The
cost benefit analysis for the Barrier
project was carried out in the 1970's,
before any of this redevelopment
had taken place. It follows that
the degree of protection now provided
by the Barrier is based on a massive
undervaluation of the UK's capital
city.
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Government's
Position
The
following statements are taken from
Hansard (official report of the
proceedings of the House of Commons).
They were both made in the same
week of November 2000:
Dr
Mance of the Environment Agency
replying to Christine Butler M.P.
at the Select Committee on Environment,
Transport and Regional Affairs:
"The
barrier's design has a planned
standard of service which climate
change and sea level rise means
will not be sustained beyond I
think 2030, although it may be
2020.That is why we have been
looking to see what we need to
do to the system to maintain that
standard of service through to
2100."
Mr
Morley, for MAFF (now DEFRA - Department
of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs),
replying to a written question about
the impact of global warming and
sea level rise on the risk of the
Thames Barrier being unable to withstand
future storm surges:
"The
Thames Barrier is the largest
component of the complex system
of gates, walls and embankments
which form the tidal barrier to
London and the Thames Estuary.
The Barrier is a robust and flexible
installation with a design based
on rates of sea level rise predicted
in the 1970's which were higher
than those currently anticipated.
It provides London with a high
level of protection from tidal
flooding and with normal care
and maintenance should continue
to do so until at least the latter
half of this century. Even then,
although the Barrier may need
to be closed more frequently,
it will continue to fulfil its
primary function."
This
answer was repeated on 12 February,
2002, with a sentence tacked on
the end:
"The
Environment Agency is currently
developing its Thames tidal defence
strategy for the next one hundred
years, with several studies already
in progress."
DEFRA
is refusing to admit, in public
at least, that there are any problems
with the present Barrier. In contrast,
the EA is clearly concerned. This
is a familiar pattern all over the
country: the EA attempts to block
building on flood plains, ministers
or councillors support the developers.
There
are rumours that the EA is conducting
feasability studies for a new barrier
to be sited downriver, possibly
around Tilbury-Gravesend where the
Estuary first narrows. A barrier
here would halt a surge well before
it reached central London, rather
than at the last minute. In addition
the barrier would not have to be
as high, since the squeeze effect
would scarcely have started, and
the banks upriver of the barrier
could be left at their present levels.
Both these features would save money.
Whether
or not the EA receives the support
it needs from DEFRA, remains to
be seen.
London
after the flood 6th Jan 1928
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